In this article I examine the metaphysical foundations of Guido de Ruggiero’s liberalism and ask what these can tell us about his changing view of Giovanni Gentile's actualism, which was such an influence on de Ruggiero before the First World War. I argue that de Ruggiero’s ‘actualism’ was never the same as Gentile’s, but was drawn from the same intellectual sources; that the actualist conception of free and self-conscious agency runs through both versions of the doctrine, though interpreted in different (...) ways; and finally that the contrasts between de Ruggiero’s and Gentile’s political allegiances result from something other than their differing interpretations of actualism, which serves, in the end, not so much as a theory as a set of basic principles, images and ideals that each philosopher tried to modify and match to the political circumstances in which he found himself. (shrink)

The way students perceive a learning climate (e.g. controlling or stimulating) is significantly influenced by feedback and assessment. However, at present much is unclear about the relation between feedback and motivational state. More specifically, the interplay with student characteristics is unclear. Since there is a strong increase of group work, the central research question is what are the effects of positive, neutral or negative feedback presented to collaborating teams of students, on students? intrinsic motivation, performance and on group processes? One (...) hundred thirty?eight higher education students participated in this study. There were no significant differences in performance across conditions. Multi?level analysis enabled a detailed comparison between groups and individual members of groups. Amongst others, it was found that feelings of competence facilitate the effect of positive feedback at the group level, which suggests that positive feedback boosts interest especially in groups of highly competent students. (shrink)

In this paper we study in details a system of two weakly coupled harmonic oscillators from the point of view of Bohm's interpretation of quantum mechanics. This system may be viewed as a simple model for the interaction between a photon and a photodetector. We obtain exact solutions for the general case. We then compute approximate solutions for the case where one oscillator is initially in its first excited state (a single photon) reaching the other oscillator in its ground state (...) (the photodetector). The approximate solutions represent the state of both oscillators after the interaction, which is not an eigenstate of the individual hamiltonians for each oscillator, and therefore the energies for each oscillator do not exist in the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. We use the approximate solutions that we obtained to compute Bohmian trajectories and to study the energy transfer between the oscillators. We conclude that, even using the Bohmian view, the energy of each individual oscillator is not well defined, as the nonlocal quantum potential is not negligible even after the coupling is turned off. (shrink)

In this paper we study in details a system of two weakly coupled harmonic oscillators from the point of view of Bohm’s interpretation of quantum mechanics. This system may be viewed as a simple model for the interaction between a photon and a photodetector. We obtain exact solutions for the general case. We then compute approximate solutions for the case where one oscillator is initially in its first excited state (a single photon) reaching the other oscillator in its ground state (...) (the photodetector). The approximate solutions represent the state of both oscillators after the interaction, which is not an eigenstate of the individual hamiltonians for each oscillator, and therefore the energies for each oscillator do not exist in the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. We use the approximate solutions that we obtained to compute Bohmian trajectories and to study the energy transfer between the oscillators. We conclude that, even using the Bohmian view, the energy of each individual oscillator is not well defined, as the nonlocal quantum potential is not negligible even after the coupling is turned off. (shrink)

For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, (...) by far, the most serious threat to the theory that we have seen in a long time. A successful reply to it requires a surprising amount of care, as it turns out. If tenable, Turri's objection deals a devastating blow to the theory developed by Roderick Chisholm, Keith Lehrer, Peter Klein, Marshall Swain, Risto Hilpinen, John Pollock, and Paul Moser, among others. Under scrutiny, however, the threat proves illusory. It results from inattention to a crucial, but relatively subtle, aspect of.. (shrink)

The application of Gödel’s theorem to the problem of minds and machines is difficult. Paul Benacerraf makes the entirely valid ‘Duhemian’ point that the argument is not, and cannot be, a purely mathematical one, but needs some philosophical premisses to be able to yield any philosophical conclusions. Moreover, the philosophical premisses are of very different kinds. Some are concerned with what is essential to being a machine—these are typically intricate, but definite, easily formalised by the mathematician, but unintelligible to the (...) layman: others attempt to capture what is essential to being a mind, a person or a self—these are typically intuitive, but vague; resistant to exact definition by the logician, but, none the less, widely used and well understood. Gödel’s theorem itself, like many other truths, can be taken either way: it can be taken as a formal proof sequence yielding certain syntactical results about a certain class of formal systems, but it can also be taken as giving us a certain type or style of argument, which we can understand, and, once having got the hang of it, adapt and apply in innumerable different circumstances. In my dispute with the mechanist, I take Gödel’s argument both ways: I first take it as an argument which the mechanist, even according to his own mechanist principles, must accept as scoring some point against his favourite machine; and then I hope that the mechanist, as a man, will see that he can do better and that this sort of argument will always apply against any form of mechanism he espouses. (shrink)

The application of Gödel’s theorem to the problem of minds and machines is difficult. Paul Benacerraf makes the entirely valid ‘Duhemian’ point that the argument is not, and cannot be, a purely mathematical one, but needs some philosophical premisses to be able to yield any philosophical conclusions. Moreover, the philosophical premisses are of very different kinds. Some are concerned with what is essential to being a machine—these are typically intricate, but definite, easily formalised by the mathematician, but unintelligible to the (...) layman: others attempt to capture what is essential to being a mind, a person or a self—these are typically intuitive, but vague; resistant to exact definition by the logician, but, none the less, widely used and well understood. Gödel’s theorem itself, like many other truths, can be taken either way: it can be taken as a formal proof sequence yielding certain syntactical results about a certain class of formal systems, but it can also be taken as giving us a certain type or style of argument, which we can understand, and, once having got the hang of it, adapt and apply in innumerable different circumstances. In my dispute with the mechanist, I take Gödel’s argument both ways: I first take it as an argument which the mechanist, even according to his own mechanist principles, must accept as scoring some point against his favourite machine; and then I hope that the mechanist, as a man, will see that he can do better and that this sort of argument will always apply against any form of mechanism he espouses. (shrink)

J. R. and Philip Milton present the first critical edition of John Locke's Essay concerning Toleration, based on all extant manuscripts, and a number of other writings on law and politics composed between 1667 and 1683. Although Locke never published any of these works himself they are of very great interest for students of his intellectual development because they are markedly different from the early works he wrote while at Oxford and show him working out ideas that were to appear (...) in his mature political writings, the Two Treatises of Government and the Epistola de Tolerantia. With authoritative contextual guidance from the editors, this will be an invaluable resource for all historians of early modern philosophy, of legal, political, and religious thought, and of 17th century Britain. (shrink)

J. R. and Philip Milton present the first critical edition of John Locke's Essay concerning Toleration, based on all extant manuscripts, and a number of other writings on law and politics composed between 1667 and 1683. Although Locke never published any of these works himself they are of very great interest for students of his intellectual development because they are markedly different from the early works he wrote while at Oxford and show him working out ideas that were to appear (...) in his mature political writings, the Two Treatises of Government and the Epistola de Tolerantia. With authoritative contextual guidance from the editors, this will be an invaluable resource for all historians of early modern philosophy, of legal, political, and religious thought, and of 17th century Britain. (shrink)

L'argumentation de Basile gravite tout entière, à travers l'exégèse biblique élaborée par la tradition, autour de la sémantique des prépositions doxologiques de la liturgie. C'est la seule clef de lecture, fournie par lui-même, qui garantisse l'homogénéité de structure de l'ensemble de l’œuvre. Sa « Théologie » ou doctrine de la Trinité, cautionnée par le Symbole de foi de Constantinople I, met en lumière « l'Économie » ou disposition trinitaire de l'histoire du salut, qui associe indissolublement l'Esprit Saint à la mission (...) du Fils, tout en « appropriant » à l'Esprit, « Don de Dieu », la mission sanctifiante et illuminatrice d'introduire dans la « familiarité » de Dieu.Basil's argument gravitates, in its entirety, around the semantics of doxological propositions in the liturgy. This is done by means of biblical exegesis elaborated by tradition. Il is the only key to an understanding, provided by himself, that guarantees the homogeneous structure of the work’s ensemble. His « Theology » or doctrine of the Trinity, supported by the Symbol of faith of Constanti- nople I, sheds light on the « Economy » or the Trinitarian disposition of salvation history, which indissolubly associates the Holy Spirit to the Son’s mission. At the same time it « appropriates » to the Spirit, « Gift of God », the sanctifying and illuminating mission that leads the way to « familiarity » of God. (shrink)

L'âpreté des débats qui eurent lieu, notamment en Cappadoce entre 360 et 378, en pleine crise arienne, autour de la nature et de la personne du Saint-Esprit, ainsi que la diversité des opinions à l'intérieur même des camps opposés sur cette question, rendent délicate l'identification exacte des adversaires combattus par Basile de Césarée en 375 dans son traité Sur le Saint-Esprit, l'un des premiers du genre, d'autant plus que lui-même trouva des contradicteurs dans les rangs de ses propres amis. Dédié (...) à son disciple Amphiloque d'Iconium, le traité vise essentiellement, au-delà d'Aèce, son compatriote Eunome, toujours vivant et virulent, que Basile avait déjà combattu vers 360-363, le théoricien arien radical de la « dissemblance » et de la « subordination » de l'Esprit au Fils et au Père, manifestement visé ici par le vocabulaire de la « connumération » et de la « coordination ». La critique contemporaine avait pensé que le principal adversaire de Basile serait son ancien maître en ascétisme Eustathe évêque de Sébaste, qui tenait sur l'Esprit une doctrine ambiguë, ne voulant le ranger « ni avec Dieu ni avec les créatures ». Sans l'exclure du nombre des adversaires, le vocabulaire et l'argumentation du traité, sans rapport avec ceux de la Lettre 125 de Basile à Eustathe, obligent à abandonner cette interprétation pour rendre la priorité à Eunome. The acrimonious debates that took place concerning the nature and person of the Holy Spirit, especialy during the Arian crisis in Cappadocia from 360 to 378, as well as the diversity of opinions within the opposing camps, makes it difficult to identify the adversaries of Basil of Caesarea in his treatise On the Holy Spirit , unique for his time. The problem is even greater because Basil found himself at odds with his own friends. Dedicated to his disciple Amphilocus of Iconium, the treatise was aimed, essentially, beyond Aëtios, at his virulent compatriot Eunomius. Basil had already engaged him around 360-363. A radical Arian theoretician of the “dissemblance” and of “subordination” of the Spirit to the Son and Father, Eunomius was clearly targeted by the vocabulary of the “connumeration” and “coordination”. Contemporary criticism thought that the principal adversary of Basil could have been his old master in asceticism, Eustathius , who held an ambiguous doctrine about the Spirit, not wishing to place it “either with God or with creatures”. Without excluding him from the number of adversaries, the vocabulary and argumentation of the treatise, which are unconnected to those of Basil's Letter 125 to Eustathius, oblige us to abandon this interpretation and give priority to Eunomius. (shrink)

O objetivo deste ensaio é examinar a recente crítica de Maria Lasonen-Aarnio à solução anulabilista do paradoxo do dogmatismo. Tal paradoxo consiste no argumento de que certos princípios epistêmicos autorizam qualquer sujeito cognoscente a desconsiderar contraevidências para o que ele sabe. Porém, esta atitude dogmática é comumente julgada como injustificada e o sujeito que a toma é comumente julgado como irracional. A solução anulabilista do paradoxo do dogmatismo foi posta em circulação por Gilbert Harman e sugere que o problema é (...) resolvido assim que se abandona a suposição de que o conhecimento não pode ser derrotado por contraevidências. Lasonen-Aarnio acredita que tal solução é insatisfatória porque ainda haveria, em certas circunstâncias, justificação para ser dogmático mesmo admitindo e sofrendo derrota epistêmica. Desse modo, a solução anulabilista deixa ainda alguma medida de dogmatismo autorizada para o sujeito. Iniciaremos com uma introdução ao problema, explicando em que consiste o paradoxo do dogmatismo e expondo as diferentes versões nas quais foi apresentado. Em seguida, vamos nos voltar para uma versão do argumento pró-dogmatismo. Consideraremos, então, a solução anulabilista proposta por Harman e a crítica de Lasonen-Aarnio. Por fim, apresentaremos três objeções à eficácia da crítica de Lasonen-Aarnio. (shrink)